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Abstract: The paper proposes a rational reconstruction of the arguments developed by Malthus and Ricardo in their 
1815 essays, Grounds of an Opinion and An Essay on Profits, to repudiate and endorse a policy of free corn trade, 
respectively. Malthus envisaged defence and opulence as two mutually alternative options and, if required to make a 
choice, he had no doubt in choosing the former. By contrast, Ricardo excluded any alternative between defence and 
opulence: trade does note give a sustainable weapon to potential enemies of Great Britain whereas trade-driven 
opulence may give Great Britain greater means to wage a war. 
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1. Introduction 
As is well-known, Thomas Robert Malthus and David Ricardo stood on opposite sides in the lively 
political debate which led to the enactment of the 1815 Corn Laws.2 In The Grounds of an Opinion 
on the Policy of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn: intended as an Appendix to 
“Observations on the Corn Laws” (1815, hereafter Grounds) Malthus repudiated the policy of free 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 University of Pisa and University of Palermo, Italy, respectively. Corresponding author: Neri Salvadori, 
Dipartimento di Economia e Management, Università di Pisa, via Cosimo Ridolfi 10, 56124, Pisa – Italy; e-mail: 
nerisal@ec.unipi.it. We wish to thank, without implicating, Sergio Cremaschi, Heinz D. Kurz, and Andrea Maneschi 
for their valuable comments on a previous version of this paper. 
2 The Corn Laws of 1804 imposed a high import duty of 30 shillings and 3¾ pence when the British market price of 
corn fell below of 63 shillings per quarter while the Corn Laws of 1815 ruled absolute foreign corn import 
prohibition for a British market price of corn below 80 shillings and free importation above: see Hollander (1997, 
Appendix B, pp. 869 – 870). As noted by Hilton (1977), “[the Corn Laws of 1804] had inaugurated a golden decade 
for most agriculturists. Though that law never operated, inflation having immediately dwarfed the prices at which it 
had imposed effective import duties, the wartime commercial blockade bestowed a natural protection on British and 
Irish corn” Hilton (1977, p. 4). Following the findings of the Parliamentary Select Committees appointed in 1813 
and 1814 to report on the corn question, the fall in domestic corn price ensuing the bumper harvest of 1813 and, 
finally, the abrupt end of the Napoleonic Wars in April 1814, the issue of foreign corn trade took the center stage in 
British political debate in the late 1814 - early 1815 (see Works IV, p. 3). Fay (1932) is a classic study in the 
historiography of the British Corn Laws. Schonhardt-Bailey (2006) provides an extensive assessment of the 
complex issues underlying their 1846 repeal under the Tory Government of Robert Peel. 
2	  
	  
	  
corn trade which he had considered favorably in his Observations on the Effects of the Corn Laws, 
and of a Rise or Fall in the Price of Corn on the Agriculture and General Wealth of the Country (1st 
ed. 1814, 3rd ed. 1815, hereafter Observations).3 By contrast, in An Essay on the Influence of a low 
Price of Corn on the Profits of Stock (1815, hereafter Essay) Ricardo explicitly endorsed the “policy 
of leaving the importation of corn unrestricted by law” (Works IV, p. 9). 
Differences of emphasis apart, historians of economic analysis basically agree that the Essay is a 
crucial stepping stone in the evolution of Ricardo’s thought towards the work of the maturity, the 
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817). In particular, three issues have extensively 
been investigated. First, since Piero Sraffa’s 1951 Introduction to the Works and Correspondence of 
David Ricardo a major bone of contention has been the so-called ‘corn-model’ as the implicit 
foundation for the famous ‘Table, shewing the Progress of Rent and Profit under an assumed 
Augmentation of Capital’ and the privileged role assigned by Ricardo to the agricultural profit rate 
(Bharadwaj 1983, De Vivo 1985, Eatwell 1975, Garegnani 1982 and 1983, Hollander 1973, 1979 
Chapter 4 and 1983, Peach 1984; more recently, see Kurz 2011). Second, a few scholars have 
checked the compatibility between the dynamic and the static features of Ricardo’s theory of 
international trade as developed in the Essay and in Chapter VII, ‘On Foreign Trade’, of the 
Principles, respectively (Burgstaller 1986, Findlay 1974, Maneschi 1983 and 1992).4 Finally, Blaug 
(1956, p. 41) has claimed that “the body of doctrine which Ricardo bequeathed to his followers 
rested on a series of definite predictions about the course of economic events which were subject to 
empirical verification, in the strictest sense of the term” whereas Hollander (1977 and 1979 Chap. 
11) has maintained that Ricardo did not make any definite prediction as to the tendency of the 
British economy towards the stationary state in the foreseeable future: technical progress, inter alia, 
would have counterbalanced the fall of the rate of profits due to diminishing returns in agriculture.5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Hollander (1992) claims that, as early as the mid-1820s, Malthus changed his mind as to the expediency of the 
policy of food autarky and resolutely turned towards the Ricardian position of unbalanced, industry-based, growth. 
Unfortunately, death prevented him from incorporating this new view into the revised 1836 version of his Principles 
of Political Economy. Hollander’s thesis is controversial: see Pullen (1995) and Hollander’s (1995) reply. See also 
Hollander (1997, Chap. 17). 
4 Note that Ricardo’s 1815 endorsement of a free-trade policy owes nothing to the principle of comparative 
advantage which is conspicuous for its absence in the Essay (see Chipman 1965, p. 481). According to Ruffin (2002, 
p. 735) Ricardo discovered the principle of comparative advantage sometime between March and October 1816. 
5 Accordingly, as concerns the Corn Laws issue, Hollander maintains: “[Ricardo’s] major point is simply that the 
rate of growth is likely to be higher in a free system than in a protected system” (1977, p. 13, and 1979, p. 609, 
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Until now, less exegetical care has been lavished on studying the logic underlying the specific 
arguments employed by Ricardo in the Essay to counteract Malthus’s endorsement of a 
protectionist food policy in Grounds. We first point out that Malthus, both in Observations and in 
Grounds, furthers the thesis that, from a strictly theoretical point of view, all trading countries gain 
from the improved international division of labor engendered by free trade. Yet, (i) political 
reasons, (ii) an optimistic view of technological progress in British agriculture and (iii) his belief 
that Great Britain and Ireland still have a backlog of under-cultivated fertile lands induce Malthus in 
Grounds to champion a policy of food autarky.6 According to Malthus, such a policy would have 
sheltered Great Britain from the threat of too heavy a dependence from foreign corn imports. 
Then we show how, in the Essay, Ricardo addresses the national security issue raised by Malthus 
in Grounds. Ricardo claims that Great Britain would become by far the largest net corn-importing 
economy in the world, as soon as it had abandoned a policy of food self-sufficiency. Provided that 
Great Britain credibly adopted a free-trade policy, the corn-producing foreign countries would have 
found it convenient to invest additional resources into their agricultural sectors so as to increase 
their production of a corn surplus suitable to meet British increased demand. Once these 
investments are carried out, Ricardo’s argument goes on, foreign countries would suffer substantial 
economic losses if they had enacted restrictive legislation as to their corn export: a refusal to export 
their corn surplus towards Great Britain would entail a glut in their domestic corn markets and a 
severe depression of their agricultural sectors. 
Finally, we provide an assessment of the debate. We first relate Malthus’s and Ricardo’s 
different trade-policy proposals to their different interpretations of the contemporary European 
situation and we investigate them also by making use of the language of modern game theory. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 analyze Malthus’s volte-face from the 
role of impartial examiner of the pros and cons of alternative corn-trade policy options in 
Observations to the role of staunch advocate of food protectionism in Grounds. Sections 4 focuses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Hollander’s emphasis). Contra Hollander’s interpretation as to Ricardo’s growth optimism and Ricardo’s views of 
the drawbacks entailed by the Corn Laws see O’Brien (1981, pp. 359 – 361 and 375 – 381). 
6 Pullen (1995, p. 525) claims that Malthus’s 1815 attitude towards foreign corn trade perfectly fits with Malthus’s 
forma mentis: Malthus was always keen to distinguish between abstract theoretical principles and the practical 
application of those principles to specific issues. Malthus himself in Grounds writes: “I protest most entirely against 
the doctrine, that we are to pursue our general principles without ever looking to see if they are applicable to the 
case before us” (Malthus 1815 [1986], p. 158). 
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on the arguments employed by Ricardo in the Essay to counteract Malthus’s concern about the 
political threat involved by too heavy a dependence on foreign corn. Section 5 develops our 
assessment of the Malthus-Ricardo debate while Section 6 concludes. 
  
2. Malthus as an impartial examiner: Observations (1814) 
Malthus describes his Observations as a detached attempt to evaluate “with the strictest 
impartiality” (Malthus 1814 [1986], p. 88) the pros and cons of the two policy options under 
scrutiny: free versus restricted importation of foreign corn. Though he claims that his goal is simply 
to afford “the materials for a just and enlightened decision; and, whatever that decision may be, to 
prevent disappointment, in the event of the effects of the measure not being such as were previously 
contemplated” (ibidem), it is fair to say that, on balance, Malthus’s analysis ends up from the side of 
free trade (for a similar appraisal see Hollander 1997, pp. 820 – 824). For Malthus if a country 
where manufactures are highly developed and all fertile lands are already fully cultivated might 
establish a trade relationship with another country where opposite economic conditions hold, it 
would not grow an independent supply of corn, granted an universal freedom of trade: 
there is every reason to suppose, that even a large landed nation, abounding in a manufacturing population, and 
having cultivated all its good soil, might find it cheaper to purchase a considerable part of its corn in other countries, 
where the supply, compared with the demand, was more abundant. If the intercourse between the different parts of 
Europe were perfectly easy and perfectly free, it would be by no means natural that one country should be 
employing a great capital in the cultivation of poor lands, while at no great distance, lands comparatively rich were 
lying very ill cultivated, from the want of an effectual demand. (Malthus 1814 [1986], p. 95, emphasis added) 
It is worth stressing that Malthus qualifies his statement that international trade between 
manufacturing and agricultural countries is mutually beneficial with the proviso “If the intercourse 
between the different parts of Europe were perfectly easy and perfectly free”. As we show in the 
next section, what in the 1814 essay is a simple caveat, in the 1815 essay becomes the crucial 
argument used by Malthus to repudiate his 1814 neutrality and to stand unreservedly for corn 
import restrictions. It is no coincidence that Ricardo in the Essay focuses just on the national 
security issue to show the inexpediency of a protectionist food policy for Great Britain. 
According to Malthus (1814), the free importation of foreign corn would have benefited the 
British manufacturing sectors from an increase in foreign demand for British manufactured 
commodities – “as all trade is ultimately a trade of barter, and the power of purchasing cannot be 
permanently extended without an extension of the power of selling, the foreign countries which 
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supplied us with corn would evidently have their power of purchasing our commodities increased, 
and would thus contribute more effectually to our commercial and manufacturing prosperity” 
(Malthus 1814 [1986], p. 99) – and would have secured a downward stabilization of domestic corn 
market price: “It must be allowed, that a free trade in corn would in all ordinary cases not only 
secure a cheaper, but a more steady, supply of grain” (Malthus 1814 [1986], p. 100). Though in 
Malthus’s view the price of corn does not uniquely and immediately determine money wages, yet 
he maintains that it exerts a strong influence on wages dynamics. Therefore, Malthus ends up that 
the free importation of foreign corn would result in a sharp reduction of British money wages and, 
consequently, production costs for British manufactures. By squeezing the wage gap between Great 
Britain and the other trading countries the free-trade induced downward stabilization of domestic 
corn market price would have benefited British manufactures (see Malthus 1814 [1986], p. 98). 
According to Malthus the drawbacks engendered by restrictions to free corn imports may be 
listed as (i) an inefficient allocation of British capital between the agricultural and the 
manufacturing sector of the British economy, (ii) an increase in production costs with the 
consequent loss of international competitiveness for British manufactures, (iii) a slowdown in 
population growth due to the high price of corn and the reduced demand for labor by the 
manufacturing sector, and (iv) the need for a repeated legislative intervention to match the ongoing 
evolution of the international corn market (see Malthus 1814 [1986], pp. 104 – 105). Malthus goes 
so far as to claim that peacetime restrictions to the free importation of foreign corn, engineered to 
keep British market price of corn at its war-time level, would ultimately harm not only British 
manufactures but also British agriculture, i.e. the very sector they were intended to support (see 
Malthus 1814 [1986], pp. 105 – 106). 
Yet, Malthus’s objectivity leads him to maintain that free corn trade and the ensuing downward 
stabilization of the British market price of corn is far from being “an unmixed good” (Malthus 1814 
[1986], p. 105). For Malthus, in fact, without tariff protection British agricultural sector would 
inevitably and substantially shrink, both in relative and absolute terms, and Great Britain would 
have to face the evils of an unbalanced economic growth.7 First, an increasing share of British 
workers would be exposed to the ups and down of domestic and international business cycle, given 
the much higher variability of the demand for manufactures than the demand for food (see Malthus 
1814 [1986], p. 101). But, cyclical fluctuations apart, Malthus is ready to acknowledge that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Malthus’s agricultural bias fully reveals the Physiocratic dimension of his thought in the early 1810s: see 
Hollander (1997, Chap. 8). 
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development of manufactures entails significant long-run beneficial welfare effects for society as a 
whole: 
Yet though the condition of the individual employed in common manufacturing labour is not by any means 
desirable, most of the effects of manufactures and commerce on the general state of society are in the highest degree 
beneficial. They infuse fresh life and activity into all classes of the state, afford opportunities for the inferior orders 
to rise by personal merit and exertion, and stimulate the higher orders to depend for distinction upon other grounds 
than mere rank and riches. They excite invention, encourage science and the useful arts, spread intelligence and 
spirit, inspire a taste for conveniences and comforts among the labouring classes; and, above all, give a new and 
happier structure to society, by increasing the proportion of the middle classes, that body on which the liberty, 
public spirit, and good government of every country must mainly depend. (Malthus 1814 [1986], pp. 101 − 102) 
Second, and foremost, Malthus highlights a political risk. Great Britain would become a country 
heavily dependent on foreign corn importation to match its food requirements. Malthus, echoing 
Smith (WN IV.ii.30), warns his readers that such a structural dependence from abroad for food 
supply may turn out to be a fearsome weapon of blackmail in the hands of foreign countries, 
especially in times of war: 
It is alleged, first, that security is of still more importance than wealth, and that a great country likely to excite the 
jealousy of others, if it become dependent for the support of any considerable portion of people upon foreign corn, 
exposes itself to the risk of having its most essential supplies suddenly fail at the time of its greatest need. (Malthus 
1814 [1986], p. 100)  
Yet, Malthus concedes that foreign countries will have few economic incentives to reduce their 
corn exports to Great Britain because such a choice would result into the loss of a significant source 
of income: 
That such a risk is not very great will be readily allowed. It would be as much against the interest of those nations 
which raised the superabundant supply as against the one which wanted it, that the intercourse should at any time be 
interrupted; and a rich country, which could afford to pay high for its corn, would not be likely to starve, while there 
was any to be purchased in the market of the commercial world. (ibidem)  
Malthus, in fact, argues that the expectation by foreign corn-producing countries of a steadfast 
adoption of a free-trade policy by Great Britain would have provided strong incentives to the former 
to increase their corn production to meet the increased British corn demand: 
there can be little doubt, that if the corn growers in the neighbourhood of the Baltic could look forward to a 
permanently open market in the British ports, they would raise corn expressly for the purpose. The same observation 
is applicable to America; and under such circumstances it would answer to both countries, for many years to come, 
to afford us supplies of corn, in much larger quantities than we have ever yet received from them. (Malthus 1814 
[1986], pp. 95 - 96) 
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Malthus concludes his ‘objective’ analysis of the pros and cons of alternative corn trade policies 
in Observations with an invitation to the British Parliament to postpone a final decision regarding 
the issue of foreign corn trade. In the alternative, Malthus proposes to give “to the restrictions the 
form of a constant duty upon foreign corn, not to act as a prohibition, but as a protecting, and at the 
same time, profitable tax” (Malthus 1814 [1986], p. 109). 
 
3. Malthus as a committed protectionist: Grounds (1815) 
Differently from Observations, in Grounds Malthus boldly declares his “deliberate, yet decided, 
opinion in favour of some restrictions on the importation of foreign corn” (Malthus 1815 [1986], p. 
151). Indeed, what Malthus presents at the outset of his 1815 essay as “some restrictions”, becomes 
in the course of the same essay a policy of food self-sufficiency, purposely engineered to make 
Great Britain dependent from corn imports only in the years of very poor domestic harvests: 
I have fully made up my mind as to the side on which the balance lies; and am decidedly of opinion, that a system of 
restrictions so calculated as to keep us, in average years, nearly independent of foreign supplies of corn, will more 
effectually conduce to the wealth and prosperity of the country, and of by far the greatest mass of the inhabitants, 
than the opening of our ports for the free admission of foreign corn, in the actual state of Europe. […] I firmly 
believe that, in the actual state of Europe, and under the actual circumstances of our present situation, it is our 
wisest policy to grow our own average supply of corn; and, in so doing, I feel persuaded that the country has ample 
resources for a great and continued increase of population, of power, of wealth, and of happiness. (Malthus 1815 
[1986], p. 160 and p. 174, emphasis added) 
The recurring clause “in the actual state of Europe” and the use of similar clauses like “under the 
actual circumstances of our present situation” in the above passages emphasize the fact that 
Malthus’s volte-face from detached impartiality to active partisanship on the issue of foreign corn 
trade does not arise from a change in the theory adopted by him.8 Malthus, in fact, insists that he 
still adheres to the weighing of free versus restricted corn trade alternatives provided in 
Observations. Malthus’s new view rather depends on his observation of what he defines as some 
new facts: 
The grounds on which the opinion so formed [in favour of some restrictions on the importation of foreign corn] 
rests, are partly those which were stated in the Observations, and partly, and indeed mainly, some facts which have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 As we show in the following Section, in the Essay Ricardo criticized Malthus for his taking as given “the actual 
state of Europe”, thus downplaying the possibility that such a state could change as a response to the adoption of a 
free-trade policy by Great Britain. 
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occurred during the last year, and which have given, as I think, a decisive weight to the side of restrictions. (Malthus 
1815 [1986], p. 152, emphasis added; see also p. 156) 
The new fact Malthus refers to is that France (which Malthus considered by far the main source 
of foreign corn supply, should Great Britain adopt a policy of free corn trade: see Hollander 1997, 
p. 829 fn. 30) has enacted a restrictive legislation on its corn export.9 The crux of Malthus’s 
argument is that the abolition of trade restrictions, if adopted unilaterally by a single country, flies 
in the face of the economic interests of that country: 
There is no person in the least acquainted with political economy, but must be aware that the advantages resulting 
from the division of labour, as applicable to nations as well as individuals, depend solely and entirely on the power 
of exchanging subsequently the products of labour. And no one can hesitate to allow, that it is completely in the 
power of others to prevent such exchanges, and to destroy entirely the advantages which would otherwise result 
from the application of individual or national industry, to peculiar and appropriate products. (Malthus 1815 [1986], 
pp. 158 – 159, emphasis added) 
The convenience for Great Britain to adopt a policy of food self-sufficiency in an international 
setting in which corn-producing countries may, at any time, introduce restrictive legislation on corn 
exports stems from the fact that, according to Malthus, the high, war-time, British market price of 
corn has encouraged “a great increase of capital laid out upon the land, and a great consequent 
extension of cultivation and improvement” (Malthus 1815 [1986], p. 152). By contrast, the free 
importation of cheap foreign corn would inevitably involve a drastic and permanent fall in British 
market price of corn and the consequent establishment of deflationary expectations therein, the 
abandonment of cultivation of marginal British lands and a slowdown of technological progress in 
agriculture. In such a scenario, Great Britain would become structurally dependent on foreign corn 
imports since average corn production on British fertile lands would not be sufficient to match 
domestic consumption needs and marginal, less-fertile, lands, once abandoned, would require time 
and considerable capital investment to be put back in a producing state: 
the fall of prices, which had lately taken place, and the alarm of a still further fall, from continued importation, had 
not only checked all progress of improvement, but had already occasioned a considerable loss of agricultural 
advances; and that a continuation of low prices would, in spite of a diminution of rents, unquestionably destroy a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 As noted by Hollander (1997), for Malthus (1815) “the issue was not free trade versus protection […] The true 
choice was between a bogus ‘free trade’ subject to French export control precluding an inflow from the Continent 
during ‘scarce years’ and a restrictive system designed to render Britain ‘in average years, nearly independent of 
foreign supplies’”(Hollander 1997, pp. 828 and 829). For Hollander, Malthus opted for the latter arrangement 
because he thought it to be that most likely to be conducive to British prosperity and security. 
9	  
	  
	  
great mass of farming capital all over the country, and essentially diminish its cultivation and produce. (Malthus 
1815 [1986], p. 153) 
Malthus’s turn towards food autarky in Grounds is reinforced by Malthus’s beliefs that (i) the 
extension of British and Irish territory is such as to push the threat of diminishing returns in 
agriculture to a far distant future and (ii) the high domestic market price of corn under autarky 
would keep on stimulating technological progress in agriculture and provide sufficient incentives to 
spread the best agricultural techniques throughout the country: 10 
if merely the best modes of cultivation, now in use in some parts of Great Britain, were generally extended, and the 
whole country was brought to a level, in proportion to its natural advantages of soil and situation, by the further 
accumulation and more equable distribution of capital and skill; the quantity of additional produce would be 
immense, and would afford the means of subsistence to a very great increase of population. […] It is quite evident 
that … the united empire [Great Britain and Ireland] has ample means of increasing in wealth, population, and 
power, for a very long course of years, without being habitually dependent upon foreign supplies for the means of 
supporting its inhabitants. (Malthus 1815 [1986], p. 161, emphasis added)  
 
4. Ricardo’s critique of “arguments almost unanswerable respecting the danger of 
dependence on foreign countries”: the Essay (1815) 
Ricardo’s Essay belongs to the rich pamphlet literature which blossomed “in anticipation of the 
debates in the House of Commons on the question of the Corn Laws” (Works IV, p. 4) and has aptly 
been described as “an essay in persuasion” (Hollander 1979 , p. 118). Its title in extenso reads: An 
Essay on the Influence of a low Price of Corn on the Profits of Stock; shewing the Inexpediency of 
Restrictions on Importation: With Remarks on Mr. Malthus’s Two Last Publications: “An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Progress of Rent” and “The Grounds on the Policy of Restricting the 
Importation of Foreign Corn”. Malthus’s two contributions mentioned by Ricardo were published 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Malthus’s views on the role of Ireland as the British granary, the existence of as yet unexploited efficiency gains 
by implementing agricultural best-practices throughout British farms and the severe capital and corn production 
losses deriving from British marginal lands being put out of tillage were widely shared in the 1814 – early 1815: see 
Hilton (1977, p. 23). See also the summary of the report of the 1814 Grain Committee provided by Smart: “The 
sudden removal of these [war-time] impediments [to foreign corn importation] might prevent the enclosure and 
cultivation of great tracts of land still lying waste and unproductive, counteract the spirit of improvement in other 
quarters, and check its progress upon lands already under tillage. […] If [cold clay or waste and inferior  lands] were 
withdrawn from tillage, they would for many years be of very little use as pasture, and the loss from such a change, 
as well to the occupiers as to the general stock of national subsistence, would be very great” (Smart 1910 - 1917, I, 
pp. 415 – 416, quoted in Hollander (1997, p. 740 fn 1). 
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on February 3 and 10, respectively; while Ricardo’s Essay was published on February 24, 1815 
(Works IV, p. 5). After reading the Rent essay, in a letter to Malthus, dated February 6, 1815 
Ricardo expresses his warm admiration to his friend: 
I have now read with very great attention your essay on the rise and progress of rent [Ricardo refers to An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Progress of Rent] with a view of selecting every passage which might afford us subject for 
future discussion. It is no praise to say that all the leading principles in it meet with my perfect assent, and that I 
consider it as containing many original views, which are not only important as connected with rent, but with many 
other difficult points, such as taxation &ca. &ca. (Works VI, p. 172, emphasis added) 
But just a week later, after reading Malthus’s protectionist essay, Ricardo exposes what in his 
view appears to be a chasm between Malthus as the pure theorist of An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Progress of Rent and Malthus as a supporter of a protectionist policy in Grounds: 
I have read the Appendix [Ricardo refers to Grounds] also with great attention and cannot help thinking that you 
have quite thrown off the character of impartiality to which in the observations [Ricardo refers to Observations] I 
thought you fairly entitled. You are avowedly for restrictions on importation; of that I do not complain. It is not easy 
to estimate justly the dangers to which we may be exposed.— Those who are for an open trade in corn may 
underrate them, and it is possible that you may overrate them. It is a most difficult point to calculate these dangers at 
their fair value, — but in an economical view, altho’ you have here and there allowed that we might be benefited by 
importing cheap, rather than by growing dear—you point out many inconveniences which we should suffer from the 
loss of agricultural capital, and from other causes; which would make it appear as if even economically you thought 
we ought [not] to import corn,—such is the approbation with which you quote from Adam Smith of the benefits of 
agriculture over commerce in increasing production, and which I cannot help thinking is at variance with all your 
general doctrines (Works VI, pp. 177-8, emphasis added) 
The critical strategy adopted by Ricardo in the Essay consists in making use of the analytical 
results obtained by Malthus in the Rent essay concerning the relationship between rent and profits 
and a few arguments taken from Malthus’s ‘objective’ essay, Observations, to counter the 
arguments used by Malthus to support protectionism in the ‘committed’ essay, Grounds. As 
concerns rent theory and its logical implications, Ricardo stresses 
(i) the inverse relationship between rent and profits, given real wages and agricultural 
technology: 
by bringing successively land of a worse quality, or less favourably situated into cultivation, rent would rise on the 
land previously cultivated, and precisely in the same degree would profits fall; and if the smallness of profits do not 
check accumulation, there are hardly any limits to the rise of rent, and the fall of profit. (Works IV, p. 14) 
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(ii) the nature of rent as a transfer payment so that whatever cause reduces aggregate rent 
increases aggregate profits pari passu, such a redistribution of purchasing power from landlords to 
farmers leaving unscathed aggregate expenditure: 
The general profits of stock depend wholly on the profits of the last portion of capital employed on the land; if, 
therefore, landlords were to relinquish the whole of their rents, they would neither raise the general profits of stock, 
nor lower the price of corn to the consumer. It would have no other effect, as Mr. Malthus has observed, than to 
enable those farmers, whose lands now pay a rent, to live like gentlemen, and they would have to expend that 
portion of the general revenue, which now falls to the share of the landlord. (Works IV, pp. 21-22) 
Rent theory and its logical implications are the bedrock on which Ricardo anchors his 
endorsement of a free-trade policy: “The consideration of those principles [which regulate the rise 
and fall of rent], together with those which regulate the profit of stock, have convinced me of the 
policy of leaving the importation of corn unrestricted by law” (Works IV, p. 9). Accordingly, 
Ricardo’s challenge in the Essay is to demonstrate that Malthus’s 1815 endorsement of 
protectionism derives uniquely from his overvaluation of the political risks arising from foreign 
corn dependence in times of war or poor harvest abroad: 
From the general principle set forth in all Mr. Malthus’s publications, I am persuaded that he holds the same opinion 
as far as profit and wealth are concerned with the question; but, viewing, as he does, the danger as formidable of 
depending on foreign supply for a large portion of our food, he considers it wise, on the whole, to restrict 
importation. Not participating with him in those fears, and perhaps estimating the advantages of a cheap price of 
corn at a higher value, I have come to a different conclusion. Some of the objections urged in his last publication, 
“Grounds of an Opinion” &c. I have endeavoured to answer; they appear to me unconnected with the political 
danger he apprehends, and to be inconsistent with the general doctrines of the advantages of a free trade, which he 
has himself, by his writings, so ably contributed to establish. […] It is, then, the dangers of dependence on foreign 
supply for any considerable quantity of our food, which can alone be opposed to the many advantages which, 
circumstanced as we are, would attend the importation of corn. These dangers do not admit of being very correctly 
estimated, they are in some degree, matters of opinion and cannot like the advantages on the other side, be reduced 
to accurate calculation. (Works IV, p. 9 and p. 27, emphasis added) 
Ricardo’s counter-argument develops through the following chain of reasoning. Malthus 
assumed that France, Britain’s traditional enemy, would become by far the largest corn supplier to 
Great Britain, once the latter would have allowed the free import of cheap foreign corn. By contrast, 
for Ricardo, Great Britain could avail itself of a plurality of trading partners, besides France. 
Implicit in Ricardo’s argument is the assumption that many corn-producing countries have at 
present few incentives to cultivate intensively the whole of their fertile lands and no incentive to 
invest additional capital into their agricultural sectors. The main culprit for such a lack of incentives 
12	  
	  
	  
are just the British Corn Laws since they make British demand for foreign corn almost 
unpredictable and thus discourage corn-producing countries from investing additional resources into 
their agricultural sectors. Conversely, should Great Britain enact a legislation which allows the free 
importation of foreign corn whenever its domestic market price exceeds the international market 
price and not only in times of poor domestic harvest and abnormally high domestic market prices, 
Great Britain would certainly become a net corn-importing country: 
If we became a regularly importing country, and foreigners could confidently rely on the demand of our market, 
much more land would be cultivated in the corn countries with a view to exportation. […] In contemplating a trade 
in corn, unshackled by restrictions on importation, and a consequent supply from France, and other countries, where 
it can be brought to market, at a price not much above half that at which we can ourselves produce it on some of our 
poorer lands, Mr Malthus does not sufficiently allow for the greater quantity of corn, which would be grown abroad, 
if importation was to become the settled policy of this country. There cannot be the least doubt that if the corn 
countries could depend on the markets of England for a regular demand, if they could be perfectly secure that our 
laws, respecting the corn trade, would not be repeatedly vacillating between bounties, restrictions, and prohibitions, 
a much larger supply would be grown, and the danger of a greatly diminished exportation, in consequence of bad 
seasons, would be less likely to occur. Countries which have never yet supplied us, might, if our policy was fixed, 
afford us a considerable quantity. (Works IV, pp. 27 − 28 and 30, emphasis added) 
The increase in the number of British trading partners and, therefore, the diversification of its 
sources of corn supply would drastically reduce the likelihood of an international production of corn 
insufficient to match British food requirements since, for Ricardo, the worldwide variance of corn 
harvests is a decreasing function of the number of corn-producing countries tied by trade relations 
(see Works IV, p. 31). 
Then Ricardo turns to the analysis of the political danger of too heavy a dependence on foreign 
corn supply, raised by Malthus in the protectionist essay. Ricardo’s argument to downplay 
Malthus’s natural security issue is based on the following three assumptions. First, agricultural 
investment is largely a sunk cost. Second, Great Britain would become a quasi-monopsonist in the 
international corn market, should it adopt a free trade policy. Third, in every country, the domestic 
market price of corn is highly sensitive with respect to (positive or negative) market excess demand. 
A small excess (deficiency) in the quantity produced causes a sharp fall (rise) in the market price of 
corn:11 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In the Essay Ricardo writes: “the effects of plenty or scarcity, in the price of corn, are incalculably greater than in 
proportion to the increase or deficiency of quantity […] the exchangeable value of corn does not rise in proportion 
only to the deficiency of supply, but two, three, four, times as much, according to the amount of the deficiency” 
13	  
	  
	  
When we consider the value of even a few weeks consumption of corn in England, no interruption could be given to 
the export trade, if the continent supplied us with any considerable quantity of corn, without the most extensively 
ruinous commercial distress -distress which no sovereign, or combination of sovereigns, would be willing to inflict 
on their people; and, if willing, it would be a measure to which probably no people would submit. It was the 
endeavour of Bonaparte to prevent the exportation of the raw produce of Russia, more than [any] other cause which 
produced the astonishing efforts of the people of that country against the most powerful force perhaps ever 
assembled to subjugate a nation. The immense capital which would be employed on the land, could not be 
withdrawn suddenly, and under such circumstances, without immense loss; besides which, the glut of corn in their 
markets, which would affect their whole supply, and lower its value beyond calculation; the failure of those returns, 
which are essential in all commercial adventures, would occasion a scene of wide spreading ruin, which if a country 
would patiently endure, would render it unfit to wage war with any prospect of success. (Works IV, p. 28, emphasis 
added)  
And again: even “Bonaparte, when he was most hostile to us, permitted the exportation of corn 
to England by licenses, when our prices were high from a bad harvest, even when all other 
commerce was prohibited” (Works IV, p. 29). Hence, Ricardo’s chain of reasoning implies that it is 
very unlikely that foreign corn-producing countries, once they have increased their corn producing 
capacity to match British demand for corn, will reduce or even suspend their corn export towards 
Great Britain in case of a war or to make up a deficient domestic harvest. Ricardo’s appeal to the 
British Parliament not to enact a protectionist legislation derives from his reasoned guess on the 
equilibrium trade strategy of foreign corn-producing countries: “Would it be wise then to legislate 
with the view of preventing an evil which might never occur; and to ward off a most improbable 
danger, sacrifice annually a revenue of some millions?” (Works IV, pp. 29-30, emphasis added).  
While Ricardo disagreed with Malthus on the likelihood of the adoption of corn export 
restrictions by foreign countries, he concurred with him that a sudden abolition of the Corn Laws 
would have led to the financial bankruptcy of those British farmers who, by growing corn on 
marginal, less fertile, lands, could not stand the competition with cheap foreign corn producers and 
proposed a temporary tariff protection to withdraw as soon as existing agricultural lease contracts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Works IV, pp. 28 - 29 and p. 30). Ricardo devotes the whole Section IV, ‘On the Effect of Abundant Crops on the 
Price of Corn’, of his 1822 essay, On Protection to Agriculture, to the issue of the sensitiveness of the market price 
of corn: “When the quantity of corn at market, from a succession of good crops, is abundant, it falls in price, not in 
the same proportion as the quantity exceeds the ordinary demand, but very considerably more […] No principle can 
be better established, than that a small excess of quantity operates very powerfully on price. This is true of all 
commodities; but of none can it be so certainly asserted as of corn, which forms the principal article of the food of 
the people” (Works IV, p. 134). 
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expire (Works IV, p. 33). But he ridiculed any attempt to ground a protectionist argument on the 
bankruptcy of those British farmers:12 
[Malthus] dwells with much stress on the losses of agricultural capital, which the country would sustain, by allowing 
an unrestricted importation. He laments the loss of that which by the course of events has become of no use to us, 
and by the employment of which we actually lose. We might just as fairly have been told, when the steam-engine, or 
Mr. Arkwright's cotton-machine, was brought to perfection, that it would be wrong to adopt the use of them, 
because the value of the old clumsy machinery would be lost to us. (Works IV, p. 33) 
 
5. An assessment of the debate 
As the previous sections have clarified, from a strictly theoretical point of view, Malthus and 
Ricardo were both supporters of a free trade policy. The roots of the difference between them may 
be traced back to their different views on the political situation of the post-Napoleonic Europe. Two 
historical facts are strikingly relevant to comprehend Malthus’s position. One is the large-scale 
embargo against British trade, known as the Continental Blockade, which Napoleon imposed to the 
allied and conquered countries since 1806. Though this embargo ended with Napoleon’s first 
abdication, France enacted a restrictive legislation on its corn export. And this was the second fact, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The same argument is restated by Ricardo right at the conclusion of the Essay: “I shall only further observe, that I 
shall greatly regret that considerations for any particular class, are allowed to check the progress of the wealth and 
population of the country. If the interests of the landlord be of sufficient consequence, to determine us not to avail 
ourselves of all the benefits which would follow from importing corn at a cheap price, they should also influence us 
in rejecting all improvements in agriculture, and in the implements of husbandry; for it is as certain that corn is 
rendered cheap, rents are lowered, and the ability of the landlord to pay taxes, is for a time, at least, as much 
impaired by such improvements, as by the importation of corn. To be consistent then, let us by the same act arrest 
improvement, and prohibit importation” (Works IV, p. 41). In the same vein, in Chapter XIX of his Principles, ‘On 
Sudden Changes in the Channels of Trade’, Ricardo writes: “a man [...] has erected machinery in his manufactory at 
a great expense, machinery which is afterwards so much improved upon by more modern inventions, that the 
commodities manufactured by him very much sink in value. It would be entirely a matter of calculation with him 
whether he should abandon the old machinery, and erect the more perfect, losing all the value of the old, or continue 
to avail himself of its comparatively feeble powers. Who, under such circumstances, would exhort him to forego the 
use of the better machinery, because it would deteriorate or annihilate the value of the old? Yet this is the argument 
of those who would wish us to prohibit the importation of corn, because it will deteriorate or annihilate that part of 
the capital of the farmer which is for ever sunk in land. [...] To be consistent, they should endeavour to arrest all 
improvements in agriculture and manufactures, and all inventions of machinery; for though these contribute to 
general abundance [...] they never fail, at the moment of their introduction, to deteriorate or annihilate the value of a 
part of the existing capital of farmers and manufacturers” (Works I, p. 271). 
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explicitly mentioned by Malthus. These two facts, in Malthus’s view, provide a decisive weight to 
Smith’s dictum concerning the wisdom of the Navigation Act: “defence … is of much more 
importance than opulence” (WN IV.ii.30).  
Making use of a game-theoretic terminology, it is possible to claim that, in Malthus’s view, 
international corn trade between a manufacturing country and an agricultural one may be classified 
as a coordination game characterized by the presence of two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: free-
trade and autarky. The former Nash equilibrium has a higher payoff in terms of profits and capital 
accumulation, but a lower payoff in terms of security (and rents) than the latter. Malthus (1815) 
endorses food autarky for the manufacturing country since otherwise the agricultural country might 
adopt a restrictive corn export policy in case of war or poor domestic harvest. In his view it is safer 
for the manufacturing country to keep on growing its own corn to match its average food 
requirements. 
Ricardo adopted a more comprehensive perspective. As a matter of fact, the Continental 
Blockade was not sustainable. Ricardo mentions explicitly the fact that Napoleon himself permitted 
the exportation of corn to England by licenses (Works IV, p. 29). Moreover, it was a well-known 
fact that Russia initially participated to the embargo; but, its participation turning out to be too 
costly, it reopened trade with Great Britain in 1810. The enforcement of the embargo triggered the 
French invasion of Russia in 1812, which dramatically undermined French hegemony in Europe. 
Accordingly, even if corn-export restrictions can be enacted by a country, such a restrictive policy 
cannot be sustained in equilibrium, particularly if trade-expectations have induced large agricultural 
investments which cannot easily be recouped. For Ricardo, once British Parliament has abolished 
restrictive legislation on foreign corn importation and foreign countries have heavily invested into 
their agricultural sectors to match British demand for corn, their potential threat to curtail their corn 
exports in times of war or poor domestic harvests turns out to be a non-credible one: agricultural 
investments lock foreign countries into their trade relationship with Great Britain, given the sunk 
cost nature of agricultural investment and the role of quasi-monopsonist which for Ricardo, Great 
Britain would have played in the international corn market.  
Ricardo’s argument may be rationally reconstructed by means of game-theoretic concepts. For 
Ricardo as well the strategic interaction between Great Britain and foreign corn-producing countries 
is a coordination game with two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: autarky and free-trade. The 
difference between Malthus and Ricardo is that, in Ricardo’s setting, the international trade game 
has a distinctive sequential nature: should British Parliament abolish (enact) restrictive legislation 
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on foreign corn imports, foreign countries would be encouraged to (discouraged from) investing 
into their corn production capacity. Hence, even if two pure-strategy Nash equilibria exist, only one 
of them is a perfect sub-game equilibrium. Thus, Ricardo’s argument implies that it is up to the 
British Parliament to bring about whether the world-economy should keep on being trapped into the 
autarky Nash-equilibrium, or whether it may switch into the superior free-trade Nash-equilibrium. 
In the former scenario, Great Britain keeps on growing its own average food supply, that is, keeps 
on cultivating its marginal lands, while foreign corn-producing countries keep on under-investing 
into their agricultural sectors. In the latter scenario, Great Britain sharply reduces its corn-
production capacity by giving up cultivation of its marginal lands and, as a consequence, becomes 
permanently a net corn-importing country while foreign corn-producing countries invest additional 
resources into their agricultural sectors to match British increased demand for corn.  
Games which exhibit multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria raise the problem of equilibrium 
selection, that is, “finding rational criteria for choosing one particular Nash equilibrium as the 
solution of the game from the set of all such equilibria” (Harsanyi 1995, p. 92, Harsanyi’s 
emphasis). One of the simplest refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept is Reinhard Selten’s 
sub-game perfection which narrows the set of plausible solutions of the game by excluding all 
Nash-equilibria based on non-credible threats. More than one century before Nash and Selten, 
Ricardo criticized Malthus’s endorsement of a protectionist food policy by arguing that the national 
security issue raised by him is based on a non-credible threat: unlike Malthus, Ricardo claimed that 
foreign corn-producing countries have no incentive to and, as a consequence, will not actually 
curtail or even halt their corn exports towards Great Britain in case of war or poor domestic 
harvests.	   
 
6. Final remarks  
In their 1815 essays, Grounds and Essay, both Malthus and Ricardo envisaged two possible 
equilibria within the trade relationship between Great Britain and foreign corn-producing countries: 
free-trade and autarky. Moreover, both Malthus’s and Ricardo’s arguments imply that Great Britain 
and foreign corn-producing countries are better off if they both adopt a free-trade policy. Yet, 
Malthus is strongly concerned about the prospect of agricultural countries adopting a restrictive 
export policy in times of war or poor domestic harvest. Hence, Malthus maintains that it is safer for 
Great Britain to keep on growing its own corn supply to match its average food requirements. By 
contrast, Ricardo argues that, once Great Britain has adopted a free-trade policy, foreign agricultural 
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countries would have found it convenient to increase their corn production capacity to match British 
increased demand for corn. Once these agricultural investments are carried out, the potential threat 
to curtail their corn exports in times of war or poor domestic harvests is a non-credible one: foreign 
agricultural countries are locked into their trade relationship with Great Britain, given the sunk cost 
nature of agricultural investments and the role of quasi-monopsonist which for Ricardo, Great 
Britain would have played in the international corn market. Accordingly, within the theoretical 
world of Ricardo’s Essay, free-trade is the only equilibrium which, more than 150 years later, 
Selten would christen as sub-game perfect.  
Malthus envisaged defence and opulence as two mutually alternative options and, if required to 
make a choice, he had no doubt in choosing the former. In this, he was a good pupil of Adam 
Smith. By contrast, Ricardo excluded any alternative between defence and opulence: trade does 
note give a sustainable weapon to potential enemies of Great Britain whereas trade-driven opulence 
may give Great Britain greater means to wage a war. 
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